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1.1 Introduction
When did Latin America fall behind, and has the gap between the de-
veloped countries and Latin America widened over time are recurrent
questions among economic historians. The idea of long-run relative de-
cline since independence has been favored in the literature (Bulmer-
Thomas 1994, 410), while it is widely accepted that the origins of modern
Latin American economic retardation are located in the nineteenth cen-
tury (Coatsworth 1993; Haber 1997). Coatsworth (1998) emphasizes that
Latin America fell behind between 1700 and 1900, while the gap with the
United States remained unchanged during the twentieth century. The evi-
dence on comparative real product per head, assembled by Pablo Astorga
and Valpy Fitzgerald (1998, 353), lends support to this view.1
Explanatory hypotheses for the early failure of Latin America empha-
size the initial colonial conditions. The radically different evolution of An-
glo and Latin Americas reflects the imposition of distinct metropolitan in-
stitutions on each colony (North 1990). Initial inequality of wealth, human
capital, and political power conditioned institutional design and, thus,
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1. In a recent paper, however, Astorga, Bergés, and Fitzgerald (2005) stress that the per
capita income trend for a sample of thirteen countries diverged from that of the United States
in the second half of the twentieth century.
poor performance in Latin America relative to the United States (Enger-
man and Sokoloff 1997). Latin America’s fate could thus be explained with
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson’s (2002) “reversal of fortune” theory:
in areas of relative affluence, with abundant population, such as Meso-
America and the Andes, Europeans established “extractive institutions,”
with political power concentrated in the hands of an elite, as the most effi-
cient choice—in spite of its long-term negative effects on growth. While in
poor, less densely populated areas, Europeans settled in large numbers and
developed their own institutions that encouraged investment and growth.2
Another view stresses the role of colonial independence in modern Latin
America’s destiny. The break with colonial rule destroyed institutions that
provided credible commitments to rights and property within the Spanish
empire and, as a result, widespread turmoil, violence, and political insta-
bility took place after independence, with the consequence of sluggish eco-
nomic growth (North, Summerhill, and Weingast 2000). Views from the
Dependencia school concur. The failure to achieve sustained and balanced
growth in the new republics over the nineteenth century resulted from the
persistence of colonial heritage (Frank 1967; Stanley and Barbara Stein
1970). Dependentists saw the opening to the international economy as a
cause of increasing inequality across and within countries, stressing the
role of the terms of trade in Latin American retardation by shifting re-
sources to primary production (Singer 1950) and by provoking immiseriz-
ing growth (Prebisch 1950).
Interpretations of Latin America’s early backwardness rest on a long-
run comparison with the United States. It must be pointed out, however,
that most countries, including those of Western Europe, fell behind over
the nineteenth century when measured by American standards (Maddison
2003; Prados de la Escosura 2000). Moreover, the claim that Latin Amer-
ica’s relative position to the United States remained mostly unaltered dur-
ing the twentieth century, as proof that her economic retardation occurred
in the nineteenth century (Astorga and Fitzgerald 1998; Coatsworth 1998)
is at odds with the post-1950 catching-up experience in large areas of the
periphery (southern Europe, southeast Asia), in which the gap with the
United States in income per head was significantly reduced. The United
States appears, therefore, a questionable yardstick to assess Latin Amer-
ica’s economic performance.3
Whether Latin America fell behind in the late twentieth century or in the
16 Leandro Prados de la Escosura
2. A forerunner of this view is Stanley and Barbara Stein’s (1970, 128) counterfactual ar-
gument: “had the Englishmen found a dense and highly organized Amerindian population,
the history of what is called the United States would record the development of a stratified,
bi-racial, very different society.”
3. The U.S. exceptionalism was emphasized by Stanley and Barbara Stein (1970, 128): “the
existence of a huge, under-populated virgin land of extraordinary resource endowment di-
rectly facing Europe and enjoying a climate comparable to that of Europe represented a po-
tentiality for development which existed nowhere else in the New World.”
early nineteenth century has important consequences for the ongoing de-
bate on its causes. If her backwardness originated in the decades after inde-
pendence, institutional and factor endowments differences with the United
States and western Europe are relevant to provide an explanation. If, how-
ever, her retardation occurred in the late twentieth century, discrepancies
between Latin and British Americas during the colonial and the post-
independence periods become secondary to exploring what went wrong in
Latin America during the phase of widespread catching up to the developed
countries in regions of the periphery (southern Europe, East Asia). Expla-
nations that emphasize the cost of inward-looking policies, macroeconomic
instability, and poor contract enforcement would then come to the fore.4
My purpose in this paper is to reexamine the timing of Latin America’s eco-
nomic retardation—first, by using a more representative comparator, such as
a group of countries included under the OECD acronym, and second, by
resorting to the tools employed in the inequality literature.5 Interestingly, in
their pioneering contribution, Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002, 738) did
not discuss the case of Latin America, “because its economic growth over the
last two centuries has roughly coincided with the world average.”6
Among the main findings of the paper that can be highlighted are that,
contrary to widespread belief, it was during the late twentieth century
when Latin America fell behind more dramatically. A long-term rise in real
average per capita income inequality is found for a large sample of coun-
tries encompassing most of Europe, the Americas, and Oceania. The rise
in intercountry inequality resulted from the widening gap between the
OECD countries and Latin America, as opposed to the reduction in in-
come differences within each of these country groups. As a result, polar-
ization emerged.
This chapter is organized as follows: section 1.2 compares per capita in-
come levels and growth rates. Section 1.3 presents new measures of long-
run intercountry economic inequality that can be decomposed into the
underlying changes within and across regions’ inequality. When did Latin
America fall behind is re-assessed in the concluding section.
1.2 Real Income Trends
In international comparisons, dissatisfaction with nominal income (that
is, GDP per head in national currency converted into a common currency,
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4. Such as those proposed, among others, by Cardoso and Fishlow (1992), Edwards (1995),
de Gregorio (1992), and Taylor (1998).
5. I describe OECD, for short, as a sample of today’s advanced nations from Europe, the
so-called “areas of new settlement” or Maddison’s (2003) “European offshoots” (Australia,
Canada, and New Zealand), the United States, and Japan.
6. No systematic assessments of international inequality over the long run exist other than
Bourguignon and Morrisson’s (2002) and Lindert and Williamson’s (2003) contributions.
using the trading exchange rate) has led to an almost generalized use of real
income (the conversion of per capita income into a common currency is
carried out with a purchasing power parity [PPP] exchange rate).7 Unfor-
tunately, the construction of PPP converters involves high costs in terms of
time and resources. Only PPPs for a restricted country sample that does
not include any of Latin America have been constructed for earlier periods,
and most of them for output components.8
An indirect method to derive historical estimates of real income levels
for a large sample of countries is the backward projection of PPP-adjusted
GDP per capita for a recent benchmark with volume indices (or growth
rates) of product per head derived from national accounts data.9 It is worth
noting that fixed-base real (PPP-adjusted) product data represent a most
convenient alternative to carrying out painstaking direct comparisons
across space and time, and have the presentation advantage that their
growth rates are identical to those calculated from national accounts.10
Alas, a distant PPP benchmark introduces distortions in intertemporal
comparisons, since its validity depends on how stable the basket of goods
and services used to construct the original PPP converters remains over
time. As growth occurs over time the composition of output, consumption,
and relative prices all vary, and the economic meaning of comparing real
product per head based upon remote PPPs becomes entirely questionable.
Hence, using a single PPP benchmark for long-run comparisons implies
the hardly realistic assumption that no changes in relative prices (and
hence, no technological change) takes place over time.
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7. Empirical evidence gathered in recent years strongly rejects the conventional results ob-
tained through the trading exchange rate converter (Summers and Heston 1991, van Ark
1993). Trading exchange rates only reflect the purchasing power of goods traded internation-
ally, and are influenced by capital movements, exchange controls, and speculation (Maddison
1995, 162). In other words, foreign exchange rates do not measure relative price levels and do
not move with them over time (Ahmad 1998).
8. In addition to O’Brien and Keyder’s (1978) and Fremdling’s (1991) PPP computations
for commodity output, there are sectoral PPP estimates: for agriculture, Luiten van Zanden
(1991) and O’Brien and Prados de la Escosura (1992), and for manufacturing, Broadberry
and Fremdling (1990), Broadberry (1994, 1997), Burger (1997), and Dormois and Bardini
(1995). Exceptionally, Williamson (1995) used an income approach. Recently, Ward and De-
vereux (2003a, 2003b) have accepted the challenge to build direct PPP estimates from the ex-
penditure side for twelve western economies at five benchmarks (1872, 1884, 1905, 1930, and
1950).
9. Maddison’s (2003) 1990 Geary-Khamis dollar estimates provide the best example.
10. A significant strand of the literature defends the view that the best estimates of growth
rates are those obtained from national accounts (Bhagwati and Hansen 1973; Isenman 1980;
Kravis and Lipsey 1991; Maddison 1991, 1995) on the grounds that “using domestic prices to
measure growth rates is more reliable, because those prices characterize the trade offs faced
by the decision making agents” (Nuxoll 1994, 1423). Kravis and Lipsey (1991, 458) argued
that growth rates derived from domestic prices were preferable because the basket of goods
used “reflected the preferences of purchasers of final product in one of the years being com-
pared.”
Since PPP exchange rates were not computed directly for Latin Ameri-
can countries in 1990 (Maddison 1995, 2001), I have resorted to a set of
own-country weights (Paasche) PPP direct computations by the Economic
Commission for Latin America (ECLA) for 1960, never used before in his-
torical studies, which provides a wider spatial coverage. The commodity
basket included 261 consumption goods and 113 investment goods for cap-
ital cities in nineteen Latin American countries and the United States
(Houston and Los Angeles). Prices were collected in 1960–62. Quantity
expenditure weights for a Latin American average and the United States in
1960 were used (ECLA 1968; Stanley Braithwaite 1968).11 Alternatively,
Geary-Khamis PPPs, derived by the UN’s International Comparisons
Project (ICP), could have been used for most Latin American countries in
198012 (and for all in 1996).13 There are two reasons for the choice of the
1960 benchmark: (a) in absence of current price PPP-adjusted GDP levels,
real income at 1960 U.S. prices provides an intermediate year for the time
span considered that it is preferable to the use of a benchmark year for the
end of the twentieth century,14 and (b) GDP volume series expressed in U.S.
relative prices (derived with Paasche PPPs) facilitate the comparison with
available OECD countries’ real (PPP-adjusted) income per head, ex-
pressed in U.S. relative prices (Prados de la Escosura 2000). A set of real
product per head estimates, which includes Europe, the Americas, Ocea-
nia, and Japan, has been constructed at 1960 U.S. relative prices by pro-
jecting backward with volume indices the benchmarks for Latin America
(ECLA 1968) and my own one for OECD countries (Prados de la Escosura
2000).15
Figure 1.1 and table 1.1 present trends in population-weighted measures
of real GDP per head in Latin America and OECD over one and a half cen-
turies for different country samples in which time and spatial coverage are
inversely related, so the lengthier the time span covered the lower the num-
ber of countries comprised in the sample. Hence, the figures for wider cov-
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11. PPPs in ECLA (1960) appear, thus, to be superior in country coverage but not in com-
modity coverage to Program of Joint Studies on Latin American Economic Integration and
Development (ECIEL) benchmark estimates for 1970 and 1975 (Salazar-Carrillo 1983;
Salazar-Carrillo and Tirado de Alonso 1988; Salazar-Carrillo and Prasada Rao 1988).
12. I have replicated the whole exercise presented here at 1980 international prices with no
major discrepancies in the results, except for the fact that relative levels of Latin America’s per
capita GDP in terms of OECD average are significantly higher when expressed in 1980 inter-
national dollars.
13. It is worth noting that the 1970 benchmark, originally published by CEPAL (the Span-
ish acronym of ECLA; 1978) and used in Astorga, Bergés, and Fitzgerald (2005), is just a pro-
jection of the 1960 benchmark levels with each Latin American country’s inflation differen-
tial to the United States.
14. I am currently preparing new shortcut current price estimates of real income (at U.S. rel-
ative prices) for Latin America.
15. The sources for the volume indices of GDP per head are provided in appendix A.
erage in table 1.1 (columns in bold) should be preferred.16 Some main fea-
tures of historical performance in Latin America can be pointed out. In the
first place, the origins of modern economic growth, as defined by a sus-
tained increase in output per person, can be traced back at least to the mid-
nineteenth century. Latin America appears to have experienced a sus-
tained and gradual growth over one and a half century, a trend only broken
during the 1890s, the Great Depression, and, especially, the 1980s crisis, in
which per capita GDP multiplied by 8.5 times.
Alas, only scant quantitative evidence exists for the early nineteenth cen-
tury. Growth rates varied substantially across Latin America. Mexico
seems to have experienced a decline in per capita income during the period
of independence and a very mild recovery between the 1820s and mid-
nineteenth century (Coatsworth 1989, 2003; Salvucci 1997), and the fate of
Peru was probably similar (Quiroz 1993), while Brazil appears to have
experienced stagnation (Leff 1982) and, perhaps, also Colombia
(Kalmanovitz 2005; Jaramillo Uribe, Meisel, and Urrutia 2001). A long-
run improvement in income per head occurred in Cuba until 1860 (Fraile,
Salvucci, and Salvucci 1993; Santamaría 2005), Venezuela (Baptista 1997),
Chile (Díaz, Lüders, and Wagner 1998), and it can be guessed, also in the
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Fig. 1.1 Real per capita GDP in Latin America, the OECD, and the United States
(1960 U.S. relative prices)
16. The data in figure 1.1 correspond to roughly decadal benchmarks in order to facilitate
its reading. Table 1.1 presents all the available benchmarks.
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River Plate (Newland 1998; Newland and Poulson 1998).17 On the whole,
and if the fragmented evidence and conjectures for each country are
weighted by its population, it can be hypothesized that, once independence
was completed, moderate per capita income growth (below 0.5 percent per
year) took place between the 1820s and mid-nineteenth century. If we ac-
cept these conjectures, it could be hypothesized that real per capita income
multiplied by 10 between 1820 and 2000.
In table 1.2 growth rates are presented for different aggregates of Latin
American countries; fortunately, the picture they offer of Latin America’s
long-run performance appears quite robust. After a slow start, Latin
America grew significantly during the three decades following 1860 and,
after the 1890s slowdown, growth accelerated in the early years of the twen-
tieth century up to World War I. A comparison with the advanced coun-
tries shows that Latin America experienced faster growth than the OECD
group in the 1880s and from 1900 to 1913. Latin America’s output per head
slowed down during World War I and reached a halt in the years of the
Great Depression, but its comparative performance was not dissimilar
from that of OECD countries during the interwar years. After the Depres-
sion, Latin America enjoyed its fastest phase of growth, which lasted more
than four decades (1938–80). Its rate of growth remained, however, below
that of OECD countries, and only exhibited a better performance in the
1970s. As for the “Golden Age” (1950–73), Latin America only managed to
match the U.S. growth rate, but was way behind that of the OECD group.
The 1980s represented a major break in the long-run performance of Latin
America that the sluggish growth of the 1990s failed to offset. On the
whole, the last two decades of the twentieth century offer the poorest rela-
tive economic record in the last one hundred and fifty years of Latin Amer-
ican history.
To sum up, during the decades after independence Latin America expe-
rienced moderate economic growth that fell short of that achieved by a
small group of rich countries. Latin America then kept pace with the
growth of the advanced countries’ club throughout the period 1860–1938.
The second half of the twentieth century represents, in turn, a phase of
relative decline that was exacerbated in its last twenty years. In an
22 Leandro Prados de la Escosura
17. For Venezuela, Baptista (1997) estimates indicate an annual compound rate of 2.2 per-
cent for real income per head between 1831–35 and 1851–55. As for Cuba, figures suggested
by Fraile, Linda and Richard Salvucci (1993), and Santamaría (2005) allow us to suggest that
per capita GDP grew at 0.6 percent per year between 1830 and 1850. In the case of Chile,
Díaz, Lüders, and Wagner (1998) figures suggest that real output per head grew at 1.4 percent
between 1820 and 1850. In turn, Argentina’s littoral agricultural output per head grew at 2
percent per year over 1825–1865 (Newland and Poulson 1998; Newland 1998). Assuming that
this sector was representative of the littoral economy as a whole, and that no per capita
growth occurred in Argentina’s interior provinces, an overall rate of growth of 0.8 percent
would result for per capita GDP. It could reasonably be assumed that Uruguay evolved as did
Argentina. As regards Mexico, a mild rise in GDP per capita at 0.2 percent per year over the
period 1820–45 is suggested by Coatsworth (2003).
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increasingly globalized world, in which access to the latest technological
vintage depends upon a country’s social capability, Latin American per-
formance appears especially disappointing. The cases of southern Europe
and, more recently, of southeast Asian nations provide a most interesting
counterpoint. Starting from lower levels of GDP per head and, subse-
quently, with a poorer endowment of human and physical capital, a faster
growth rate could, ceteris paribus, have been expected. However, only in
the 1880s, 1900–13, and in the 1970s, did Latin America grow above the
OECD average (and the United States).
Decomposing per capita GDP growth using identity (I) provides a more
accurate description of Latin American slowdown in the late twentieth
century. If low case represents annual rates of variation, per capita income
growth can be broke down into the addition of the rates of variation of
output per economically active population (EAP), of the activity rate (the
EAP ratio to population ages 15 to 64, or potentially active population
[PAP]), and of the share of PAP in total population.
(1) ypc   
In the 1950s and 1960s, labor productivity overcame per capita GDP
growth, making for a declining activity rate and a higher dependency rate
(the ratio of population below 15 and above 65 to PAP; table 1.3). Since the
1970s, however, labor productivity lagged behind GDP per head growth
but was offset by the rise in the activity rate and by the demographic gift of
an increasing share of potentially active population, that, from 1980 on-
ward, constituted the only basis for rising per capita income. The increase
in the activity rate was related to the reduction of unemployment and, es-
pecially during the nineties, to the incorporation of women into the labor
force (Astorga, Bergés, and Fitzgerald 2003, 35).
A further decomposition of labor productivity into physical and human
capital per worker and total factor productivity (TFP) is necessary to un-
pap

population
eap

pap
y

eap
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Table 1.3 Per capita GDP growth and its components in Latin America (%; annual
logarithmic growth rates)
Per capita GDP GDP per EAP EAP/PAP PAP/Population
1950–1960 1.9 2.5 –0.2 –0.3
1960–1970 2.8 3.5 –0.3 –0.1
1970–1980 3.0 1.9 0.5 0.4
1980–1990 –0.7 –1.0 0.0 0.6
1990–2000 1.4 –0.3 0.6 0.6
Sources: See appendix A.
Notes: EAP  economically active population; PAP  potentially active population, that is,
population ages 15 to 64.
derstand the slowing down in workers’ efficiency. For the 1980–2000 pe-
riod, Astorga, Bergés, and Fitzgerald (2003, 34) suggest an average decline
in TFP growth together with a deepening fall in capital. A more benign
view of TFP growth is offered by André Hofman (2001), who points out
that the decline in labor productivity reflects a “strong increase” in labor
inputs.18
So far, the focus of attention has been on Latin America as a whole (fig-
ure 1.2), but the region comprises a heterogeneous group of countries that
exhibit substantial discrepancies in their factor endowments and long-run
performance. The fact that most economic historians only focus their re-
search on a country or just one of its regions supports the case. Latin
America as a whole is, however, what scholars see from the outside and,
therefore, remains a valid concept once allowance is made for the wide dis-
persion in terms of performance and policies.
Growth rates in per capita GDP for major Latin American countries at
roughly decadal benchmarks are presented since 1850 in table 1.4. The
high variance of growth rates across countries and across different periods
is worth highlighting. Argentina, Chile, and Mexico’s income per head
grew above Latin America’s average between 1870 and 1913, while Brazil,
Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela achieved it during 1913–38. On the whole,
When Did Latin America Fall Behind? 25
18. Also, Fajnzylber and Lederman (2000) and Hofman (2000) found a negative TFP
growth in the 1980s.
A
Fig. 1.2 Relative real per capita GDP in Latin America: A, OECD  1; 1960 U.S.
relative prices; B, U.S.  1; 1960 U.S. relative prices)
during the early phase of modern economic growth Colombia, Peru,
Venezuela, and, to a lesser extent, Argentina grew above the region’s aver-
age. In the second phase of sustained expansion (1938–80), Mexico and
especially Brazil emerge above the average, while Chile stands alone as the
best performer in the last two decades of the twentieth century. As coun-
tries starting from lower income levels (Colombia, Peru, Venezuela) have
grown faster than average, while richer countries (Uruguay, Argentina)
have grown at a slower pace over the long run, a pattern of convergence
among Latin American nations has been building up over time (see figure
1.3). It is worth noticing that the southern cone countries, and Argentina,
in particular, conditioned divergence and convergence trends within the re-
gion. In the pre-World War I era Argentina’s economic success determined
per capita income divergence across countries. Conversely, Argentina’s
slowing down from 1914 onward is behind the process of convergence ob-
served during the twentieth century.
The comparison with other regions or countries allows us to place Latin
America’s achievements into an international perspective. But, which is
the adequate yardstick to assess Latin America’s success or failure? Usu-
ally Latin America is examined in the U.S. mirror, and widespread inter-
pretations of early failure and moderate success in the twentieth century
are derived that way. However, even western European economies fell be-
hind relative to the United States over the nineteenth century (Prados de la
Escosura 2000). Moreover, the fact that Latin America’s relative position
26 Leandro Prados de la Escosura
B
Fig. 1.2 (cont.) Relative real per capita GDP in Latin America: A, OECD  1;
1960 U.S. relative prices; B, U.S.  1; 1960 U.S. relative prices)
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to the United States remained mostly unaltered during the twentieth cen-
tury seems at odds with the catching-up experience in large areas of the pe-
riphery. Southern Europe and southeast Asia reduced their gap with the
United States significantly after 1950 (Maddison 2003), whereas Latin
America only grew faster than the United States in the 1970s. The United
States represents, therefore, a questionable yardstick. Thus, alongside the
U.S. yardstick, I propose to use a more comprehensive one, the group of
advanced countries from the Old and New World that are today part of the
OECD.19
Figure 1.3 and table 1.5 compare the evolution of population-weighted
averages of per capita incomes in Latin America and the OECD for differ-
ent country samples, and the results tend to be robust. Two phases can be
depicted. The first one, between mid-nineteenth and mid-twentieth cen-
tury, shows for Latin America a rather stable relative position, around 30
percent of OECD income per head. A second phase covers the late twenti-
eth century, in which in spite of sustained growth a decline in Latin Amer-
ica’s relative position occurred, with the exception of the slight recovery of
the 1970s. The fall in the 1980s appears particularly intense, from which
28 Leandro Prados de la Escosura
19. This sample includes countries that belonged to the European periphery but that today
are part of the core, such as Italy, Ireland, or Spain.
Fig. 1.3 Real per capita GDP in Latin American countries (1960 U.S. 
relative prices)
Latin America had not recovered by 2000, when her average income per
head relative to OECD was practically half the share it represented in 1950.
When, instead, the comparison is carried out with the United States (fig-
ure 1.3 and table 1.6), a decline is observed between 1850 and 1870 (from
36 to 27 percent of the U.S. GDP per head), followed up to 1938 by stabil-
ity—around one-fourth of the U.S. per capita income. A two-step decline,
in 1938–50 and the 1980s, reduced Latin American GDP per head relative
to the United States by the end of the twentieth century to just half its share
in 1938. These results do not warrant, therefore, the widely held view of
Latin America’s relative stability in terms of U.S. income throughout the
twentieth century.
And what can be conjectured about Latin America’s relative position in
the early nineteenth century? The outcome is highly sensitive to the inclu-
sion of Coatsworth’s (1989, 2003) guesstimates about Mexican perfor-
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Table 1.5 Relative per capita GDP in Latin America and the OECD (OECD  1)
RLA5 RLA6 RLA7 RLA10 RLA15 RLA20
1820 0.40
1830 0.36
1840 0.34
1850 0.32 0.34 0.34
1860 0.27 0.32 0.29
1870 0.27 0.31 0.29
1880 0.26 0.31 0.29
1890 0.29 0.31 0.32
1900 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.28
1913 0.29 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.31
1925 0.28 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.32
1929 0.27 0.31 0.30 0.32 0.31
1933 0.28 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.32
1938 0.27 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.31
1950 0.22 0.25 0.26 0.30 0.29 0.28
1955 0.21 0.23 0.24 0.27 0.26 0.26
1960 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.26 0.25 0.24
1965 0.20 0.21 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.22
1970 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.21
1975 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.23
1980 0.24 0.23 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.22
1985 0.20 0.19 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.19
1990 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.16
1995 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.17
2000 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.16
Sources: See appendix A.
Notes: Numbers in italics are based on estimates for most countries. See text for explanation.
RLA5  LA5: OECD7; RLA6  LA6: OECD10; RLA7  LA7: OECD14; RLA10  LA10:
OECD20; RLA15  LA15: OECD21; and RLA20  LA20: OECD21. See table 1.1 notes for
explanations of abbreviations not listed here.
mance. Thus, population-weighted average income per head in Latin
America might have fallen from around half (53 percent) the U.S. income
in 1820 to above one third (37 percent) between 1820 and 1850 when a large
country as Mexico is taken on board. If, alternatively, Mexico is not con-
sidered, a milder contraction appears between 1830 and 1850: from 41 to
37 percent of OECD income. Hence, a significant decline in the relative po-
sition of Latin America can be posited only if we accept Coatsworth’s con-
jectures on Mexico’s per capita income. The question, then, remains open
until further research is carried out for Brazil and Mexico, the largest coun-
tries that decisively condition the aggregate results for Latin America.
Latin America’s position relative to the OECD group per capita income
is decomposed in table 1.7. It can be noticed that labor productivity sys-
tematically reaches higher relative levels than GDP per head as a conse-
quence of a lower share of population in working age, which results from
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Table 1.6 Relative per capita GDP in Latin America and the United States 
(U.S.  1)
RLA5 RLA6 RLA7 RLA10 RLA15 RLA20
1820 0.53
1830 0.41
1840 0.37
1850 0.37 0.37 0.36
1860 0.30 0.33 0.30
1870 0.28 0.29 0.27
1880 0.25 0.27 0.24
1890 0.29 0.28 0.28
1900 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.22
1913 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.24 0.23
1925 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.23 0.23
1929 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.22
1933 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.27 0.26
1938 0.25 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.23
1950 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.17
1955 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.16
1960 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.17
1965 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.16
1970 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.17
1975 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.18
1980 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.18
1985 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.15
1990 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.14
1995 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.14
2000 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.13
Sources: See appendix A.
Notes: Numbers in italics are based on estimates for most countries. See text for explanation.
See tables 1.5 and 1.1 for explanations of abbreviations.
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higher dependency rates, and from a lower activity rate (a feature related
to a lower female participation in the labor force). The persistence of high
dependency rates in Latin America (table 1.8) hints at the lack of incentives
to reduce fertility and to the weak demand of human capital that helped to
bring about the demographic transition in OECD countries (Galor 2004).
In sum, modern Latin America experienced sustained growth since the
second quarter of the nineteenth century—only brought to a halt during
the 1890s, the Great Depression, and, overall, the 1980s. Growth was ac-
companied by relative backwardness, in particular during the second half
of the twentieth century, and especially since 1980. It is true that Latin
America fell behind in the early years of independence if she is compared
to the core’s richest countries, but in order to understand Latin America’s
long-run economic retardation, the late twentieth century appears a more
suitable period to be explored than early independence years.
1.3 Long-Run Intercountry Inequality
A more rigorous assessment of intercountry average income inequality
for the large country sample considered, which encompasses most of Eu-
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Table 1.8 Dependency rates in Latin America: A comparison with OECD countries
Dependency rates Relative dependency rates
LA4 LA5 LA9 LA20 RLA4 RLA5 RLA9 RLA20
1850
1860
1870
1880
1890
1900 0.634 1.02
1913 0.745 0.746 1.22 1.22
1925 0.702 0.706 1.31 1.32
1929 0.699 0.702 1.29 1.30
1933 0.700 0.704 1.33 1.34
1938 0.708 0.711 0.750 1.40 1.41 1.48
1950 0.734 0.739 0.777 0.780 1.35 1.36 1.43 1.44
1955 0.774 0.782 0.777 0.785 1.38 1.40 1.39 1.40
1960 0.822 0.830 0.836 0.842 1.40 1.42 1.43 1.44
1965 0.857 0.863 0.823 0.834 1.49 1.50 1.43 1.45
1970 0.879 0.883 0.857 0.864 1.55 1.56 1.51 1.52
1975 0.834 0.837 0.790 0.804 1.52 1.53 1.44 1.46
1980 0.783 0.784 0.782 0.792 1.51 1.51 1.51 1.53
1985 0.732 0.733 0.698 0.719 1.50 1.50 1.43 1.47
1990 0.699 0.701 0.674 0.694 1.44 1.44 1.38 1.43
Sources: See appendix A.
Note: See tables 1.5 and 1.1 for explanations of abbreviations.
rope, the Americas, and Oceania, can be obtained with the comprehensive
measures provided by entropy decomposable indices. Was inequality sig-
nificantly larger in 2000 than in 1850? Can different phases be distin-
guished in inequality over time, or, as suggested by Bourguignon and Mor-
rison (2002), for the world, was there a sustained rise in inequality up to
1950 that tended to stabilize thereafter? Did the widening gap between
OECD countries (the core) and Latin America (the periphery) discussed in
the previous section contribute to the rise in long-term inequality? All are
pressing questions that deserve a response.
All measures of inequality between OECD and Latin American coun-
tries are simultaneously provided for alternative sets of countries that al-
lows us to test the sensitivity of the results to changes in their national com-
position.20 Only countries for which data on GDP actually exists are in the
sample. Needless to say, the quality and coverage of the estimates show a
large variance, and usually fall as one goes back in time.21
Population-weighted, MLD (mean logarithmic deviation), and income-
weighted, Theil measures of inequality22 are obtained as
(4) MLDy  ∑ pi ln 
(5) Theily  ∑ yi ln ,
with pi and yi representing the shares of country i in total (OECD and Latin
America) population and GDP.
The detailed results for the alternative country samples of OECD
and Latin American countries are presented in the appendix (tables
1A.1–1A.4). In addition to inequality levels, yearly rates of inequality re-
duction—in other words, the speed at which inequality falls (positive sign)
or rises (negative sign)—are shown at the bottom of each table.
A rise in per capita income inequality over the long run is observed for
all the alternative Latin America and OECD countries sets (at an annual
rate of around 1 percent over 1850–2000). It can be noticed that when mea-
sured with the MLD index, which gives more weight to changes at the bot-
tom of the distribution, a larger inequality increase and level is obtained.
yi

pi
pi

yi
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20. The more comprehensive country the sample, the shorter its time span. The countries
included in each group for real income inequality estimates are listed at the bottom of tables
1A.1–1A.4.
21. But neither heroic assumptions are introduced in an attempt to widen the geographical
coverage of the sample, nor imaginative solutions for missing countries, such as assuming
identical levels of income or growth rates as their neighbors, are employed.
22. Mean Logarithmic Deviation (MLD) is also known as Bourguignon’s L, Theil’s
population-weighted index, and GE(0). Theil is short for Theil’s income weighted index 
of inequality, also known as GE(1).
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A
B
Fig. 1.4 Inter-country inequality of real per capita GDP in Latin America and the
OECD: A, MLD indices; B, Theil indices
Moreover, the more comprehensive the country coverage, the deeper the
inequality (figure 1.4).23
Two breaks in 1938 and 1980 allow us to identify three distinctive phases
in the evolution of intercountry inequality. After a rapid increase in in-
23. Alternative MLD and Theil indices are computed for country samples starting at differ-
ent dates; thus, MLD1870 means that the computed MLD index covers the period from 1870
to 2000.
equality during 1850–70, it rose at a steady pace up to 1938, in which
episodes of shrinking inequality took place in the 1880s and the 1930s. The
disruption brought about by World War II provoked a dramatic upsurge in
inequality, and although it fell during the following three decades, its level
remained high. A major rise occurred again with the 1980s debt crisis in
Latin America, which reached up to the end of the twentieth century. In-
equality shifted upward during 1938–50 and in the 1980s at yearly rates of
4.8 and 3.2 percent, reaching levels of 0.24 and 0.36 for MLD in 1950 and
1990, respectively. It is worth recalling that it is in these two periods when
the gap in per capita income widened between Latin America and the
OECD group.
The nineteenth and twentieth centuries witnessed population and GDP
growth that proceeded with different intensity across different countries.
To what extent did the variance in their rates of growth have an impact on
income inequality? I have simulated the yearly rates at which, other things
being equal, inequality would have fallen if all countries in the sample had
enjoyed identical population (or per capita income) growth. The actual
way of carrying out the simulation was to compute weighted inequality
measures in which, ceteris paribus, population (or per capita income) re-
mained unchanged over each epoch. This amounts to allocating identical
growth rates to population (or per capita income) for all countries in the
sample. The simulation exercise has been carried out for each of the three
epochs established in the evolution of inequality: 1870–1938, 1938–80, and
1980–2000.
Table 1.9 offers the results of simulating what would have happened in
our country sample had the variance of population (or income) growth
been zero. Without a significant variance in population and per capita in-
come growth, the rise in inequality would have been larger over 1870–1938.
During 1938–80, the variance in per capita GDP growth prevented a larger
rise in inequality, while the population growth variance contributed to in-
creasing it. Both population and per capita income growth differentials
had a part in inequality shifting upward during the last two decades of the
twentieth century.
A glance at the simulations for OECD countries (table 1.10) shows that
per capita income catching up was a main instrument in the decline in in-
tercountry inequality, especially during the Golden Age. Prior to World
War I, discrepancies in population growth mattered for the decline in in-
equality, suggesting that higher fertility and dependency rates in the New
World might have contributed to checking inequality during the first phase
of globalization.
When we focus on simulations for Latin America (table 1.11) it emerges
that, over 1870–1913, differences in the pace of per capita GDP growth
across the region contributed to rising inequality, associated to the eco-
nomic progress in the areas of new settlement (Argentina and Uruguay),
while discrepancies in population growth (in which immigration mattered)
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prevented a larger increase. During most of the twentieth century (1913–
80) differences in economic growth contributed to reducing inequality, as
a local process of convergence among Latin American countries was tak-
ing place (as the southern cone and, especially, Argentina, was experienc-
ing a relative decline). After 1980, discrepancies in growth contributed to
an increase in inequality, as not all countries reacted similarly after the debt
crisis.
In sum, differentials in population growth, mostly stemming from Latin
America’s late demographic transition, represented an obstacle to reduc-
ing inequality in the OECD and Latin America country sample over 1938–
2000. Such a finding is in conflict with Bourguignon and Morrison’s (2002)
contention that population growth rates are not associated with significant
changes in world income distribution. In turn, differences in economic
growth rates within Latin America help explain local convergence over
1913–80.
Another way to look at inequality trends is to decompose OECD and
Latin American weighted inequality into the share attributable to distri-
bution changes within each region and the share that stems from differ-
ences among regions. I have followed Theil (1979, 1989) in decomposing
aggregate inequality into within-regions and between-regions inequality.
Within-regions inequality is obtained by adding up the results of weight-
ing each region’s inequality measure by its population share, in the case of
MLD, and by its income share in the case of Theil. Between-regions in-
equality is, then, obtained as the difference between total (OECD and
Latin America) inequality and the computed within-regions inequality.
In figure 1.5 one can observe that in within-regions inequality a moder-
ate rise occurred in MLD up to 1929, while a slight decline happened in the
case of Theil, followed in both cases by the dramatic rise up to 1950 and a
decline during the Golden Age that led to stability for the rest of the cen-
tury (although a rise since 1990 is noticeable for MLD). Figure 1.6 shows,
in turn, that between-regions inequality—that is, between OECD coun-
tries and Latin America—is a smoothed replica of total inequality for both
MLD and Theil. It appears, then, that the main element underlying the ob-
served increase in overall inequality was the deepening gap between
OECD countries and Latin America.
When inequality within each region is examined, OECD countries ex-
hibit (figure 1.7) a sustained decline in inequality since 1870, only inter-
rupted by the upsurge resulting from World War II and its aftermath, and
shadows closely the trend in within-regions inequality. Actually, when
viewed in the long run, the inequality decline during the Golden Age is to
a large extent the recovery of the level achieved prior to World War II.
Two clear trends emerged in inequality within Latin America (figure
1.8): a steep rise prior to 1914, followed by a sustained decline thereafter
that seems to reverse since 1990, with the final result of similar levels of in-
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AB
Fig. 1.5 Within-regions inequality of real per capita GDP in Latin America and
the OECD: A, MLD indices; B, Theil indices
AB
Fig. 1.6 Between-regions inequality of real per capita GDP in Latin America and
the OECD: A, MLD indices; B, Theil indices
AB
Fig. 1.7 Inter-country inequality of real per capita GDP in the OECD: A, MLD
indices; B, Theil indices
AB
Fig. 1.8 Inter-country inequality of real per capita GDP in Latin America: 
A, MLD indices; B, Theil indices
equality levels to those prevailing by mid-nineteenth century. Inequality
across Latin American countries increased during the first phase of glob-
alization, as countries reacted very differently, depending on their expo-
sure to international commodity and factor movements. Argentina’s eco-
nomic success determined per capita income divergence across countries.
Deglobalization in the interwar years spawned a reduction in across-
country inequality. The long-run fall in twentieth century inequality, in
spite of a new phase of globalization after 1950, is associated with a pro-
cess of convergence within Latin America, as lower-income countries
achieved faster growth than richer ones—among which Argentine’s col-
lapse had a major part. Argentina’s slowing down from World War I on-
ward contributed to the process of local convergence.
To sum up, the long-run increase in inequality is mainly due to the
widening gap between average incomes between OECD countries and
Latin America that peaked in the late twentieth century. It is then when
Latin America appears to have fallen behind. A process of convergence
within Latin America paralleled its divergence with respect to the ad-
vanced countries.
1.4 Concluding Remarks and Research Agenda
A long-term rise in real per capita income inequality for a partial sample
of the world that includes Latin America and OECD countries is con-
firmed. The deepening gap and subsequent polarization between the
OECD group and Latin America was the major factor behind the observed
increase. National differences in population growth, largely a consequence
of the late demographic transition in Latin America, held up a fall in in-
equality during the twentieth century. This finding contradicts the benign
view of a rise in inequality up to the mid-twentieth century that stabilized
thereafter, as proposed by Bourguignon and Morrison (2002) and Sala i
Martín (2002).
These results provide an answer to the question of when did Latin Amer-
ica fall behind. It is true that when compared to the select club of the core’s
richest countries that experienced sustained per capita income growth
prior to 1850, Latin America fell behind in the early years of independ-
ence—as did most countries at the time. However, the empirical findings
presented here seriously challenge conventional assessments that locate
Latin American economic retardation in the early nineteenth century and
link it to geography, initial inequality of wealth and power, colonial her-
itage, and post-independence political instability and turmoil. They all
certainly hindered long-run growth and a counterfactual scenario with law
and order, lower inequality, and British-like institutions would have cast a
higher growth rate in Latin America. However, blaming Latin America’s
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long-term backwardness on the post-colonial epoch seems far-fetched.
Contrary to a widely held view, Latin America’s retardation appears to be
a late-twentieth century phenomenon that should be explored if we want
to understand why Latin America remains a backward region in a global
world.
Ascertaining why Latin America’s retardation occurred in the late
twentieth century provides a research agenda. Why, during the period of
fastest growth in Latin America—1938–80—did Latin America fall be-
hind OECD countries, unlike southwestern Europe and East Asia? Is it mis-
leading, as claimed by Astorga, Bergés, and Fitzgerald (2003), to associate
import-industrialization strategies to faltering performance, as, when such
policies were implemented, growth intensified and welfare improved? Were
neoliberal policies the causes of post-1980 economic stagnation and rela-
tive decline? Or was it because of poor institutional quality and lack of gov-
ernment credibility? These are among the pressing questions that will re-
quire further research.
Appendix A
Sources for GDP per Capita Volume Indices 
for the OECD and Latin America
GDP volume or quantity indices and population, potentially active pop-
ulation (PAP), and economically active population (EAP) data for OECD
countries come from the national sources stated in Prados de la Escosura
(2000), Maddison (2003), Mitchell (1992, 1993, 1994), and the League of
Nations and UN yearbooks. Data for twentieth-century Latin American
GDP volumes and total and potentially active population and economi-
cally active population comes from Astorga and Fitzgerald (1998), As-
torga, Bergés, and Fitzgerald (2004), The Oxford Latin American Eco-
nomic History Database (OxLAD), The Latin American Centre, Oxford
University, http://oxlad.thedesignfly.net/, and Mitchell (1993). Otherwise,
the sources are:
Argentina: Della Paolera, Taylor, and Bózolli (2003), GDP, 1884–1990,
spliced with Cortés Conde and Harriague (1994) for 1875–84. I assumed
the level for 1870 was identical to that of 1875. Newland and Poulson
(1998) estimated Argentina’s littoral agricultural output per head grew
at 2 percent per year over 1825–65. I have assumed that this sector was
representative of the littoral’s economy as a whole, and that no per
capita growth occurred in Argentina’s interior provinces, reaching a per
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capita GDP rate of growth of 0.8 percent. Population data comes from
Newland (1998).
Brazil: Goldsmith (1986), 1850–1980.
Chile: Díaz, Lüders, and Wagner (1998), and Braun, Braun, Briones, and
Díaz (1998).
Colombia: GRECO (2002), since 1906. I assumed the level for 1900 was
identical to that of 1906.
Cuba: Fraile, Salvucci, and Salvucci (1993) and Santamaría (2005).
México: Instituto Nacional de Estadística Geografica e Informática 
(INEGI; 1995), 1850–1990. GDP figures from 1845 to 1896, interpolated
from the original benchmark estimates. Following Coatsworth (2003), 
I accepted a mild rise in GDP per capita at 0.2 percent per year over
1820– 45.
Uruguay: Bértola and Associates (1998), since 1870. I have assumed that
Uruguay evolved as did Argentina’s littoral between 1850 and 1870, as
Argentina as a whole over 1820–50.
Venezuela: Baptista (1997).
Central America (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and
Nicaragua): I obtained the level for 1913 by assuming a growth for 1913–
20 identical to that of 1920–25, the latter taken from OxLAD.
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Table 1A.1 Inter-country inequality in per capita GDP, 1850–2000
MLD indices Population shares Inequality
OECD and Latin Latin Within Between 
Latin America OECD America OECD America regions regions
1850 0.0685 0.0224 0.0766 0.8974 0.1026 0.0280 0.0405
1860 0.0863 0.0244 0.1152 0.8933 0.1067 0.0341 0.0522
1870 0.1086 0.0433 0.1465 0.8898 0.1102 0.0547 0.0539
1880 0.1110 0.0363 0.1654 0.8826 0.1174 0.0515 0.0595
1890 0.0987 0.0259 0.1869 0.8780 0.1220 0.0456 0.0532
1900 0.1190 0.0237 0.2184 0.8689 0.1311 0.0493 0.0698
1913 0.1199 0.0260 0.2505 0.8578 0.1422 0.0579 0.0620
1913 0.1272 0.0259 0.2505 0.8482 0.1518 0.0600 0.0672
1925 0.1337 0.0304 0.2149 0.8340 0.1660 0.0610 0.0727
1929 0.1439 0.0294 0.2322 0.8266 0.1734 0.0646 0.0793
1933 0.1284 0.0192 0.1939 0.8207 0.1793 0.0506 0.0778
1938 0.1456 0.0312 0.1931 0.8149 0.1851 0.0612 0.0844
1950 0.2329 0.0888 0.1923 0.7735 0.2265 0.1122 0.1207
1955 0.2281 0.0653 0.1623 0.7599 0.2401 0.0886 0.1395
1960 0.2164 0.0481 0.1331 0.7471 0.2529 0.0696 0.1468
1965 0.2326 0.0350 0.1565 0.7316 0.2684 0.0676 0.1650
1970 0.2299 0.0260 0.1411 0.7139 0.2861 0.0590 0.1710
1975 0.2059 0.0196 0.0846 0.6962 0.3038 0.0393 0.1666
1980 0.2110 0.0205 0.0673 0.6741 0.3259 0.0357 0.1752
1985 0.2491 0.0231 0.0475 0.6610 0.3390 0.0314 0.2177
1990 0.2790 0.0182 0.0428 0.6509 0.3491 0.0268 0.2522
1995 0.2812 0.0170 0.0666 0.6496 0.3504 0.0344 0.2469
2000 0.3051 0.0181 0.0743 0.6389 0.3611 0.0384 0.2667
Annual rates of inequality reduction (%)
1850–1913 –0.89 –0.23 –1.88 –1.15 –0.67
1870–1913 –0.23 1.19 –1.25 –0.13 –0.33
1900–1950 –1.34 –2.64 0.25 –1.65 –1.10
1913–1938 –0.54 –0.74 1.04 –0.08 –0.91
1913–1950 –1.63 –3.32 0.71 –1.69 –1.58
1950–1980 0.33 4.89 3.50 3.82 –1.24
1938–1980 –0.88 1.01 2.51 1.28 –1.74
1980–2000 –1.84 0.61 –0.50 –0.36 –2.10
1950–2000 –0.54 3.18 1.90 2.14 –1.58
Theil indices GDP shares Inequality
OECD and Latin Latin Within Between 
Latin America OECD America OECD America regions regions
1850 0.0559 0.0234 0.0958 0.9625 0.0375 0.0262 0.0297
1860 0.0663 0.0256 0.1435 0.9660 0.0340 0.0296 0.0367
1870 0.0876 0.0454 0.1614 0.9650 0.0350 0.0494 0.0382
1880 0.0844 0.0371 0.1903 0.9634 0.0366 0.0427 0.0417
1890 0.0721 0.0263 0.1967 0.9578 0.0422 0.0335 0.0385
1900 0.0794 0.0230 0.2180 0.9603 0.0397 0.0308 0.0486
(continued )
Table 1A.1 (continued)
Theil indices GDP shares Inequality
OECD and Latin Latin Within Between 
Latin America OECD America OECD America regions regions
1913 0.0811 0.0246 0.2506 0.9505 0.0495 0.0358 0.0453
1913 0.0853 0.0243 0.2506 0.9475 0.0525 0.0362 0.0491
1925 0.0930 0.0286 0.2162 0.9418 0.0582 0.0395 0.0535
1929 0.0982 0.0276 0.2386 0.9407 0.0593 0.0401 0.0581
1933 0.0876 0.0178 0.2078 0.9366 0.0634 0.0298 0.0577
1938 0.1003 0.0271 0.2002 0.9363 0.0637 0.0382 0.0622
1950 0.1749 0.0796 0.1876 0.9289 0.0711 0.0872 0.0876
1955 0.1666 0.0594 0.1617 0.9288 0.0712 0.0667 0.1000
1960 0.1557 0.0430 0.1342 0.9246 0.0754 0.0498 0.1059
1965 0.1607 0.0328 0.1569 0.9230 0.0770 0.0424 0.1183
1970 0.1595 0.0248 0.1455 0.9153 0.0847 0.0350 0.1244
1975 0.1507 0.0189 0.0934 0.9033 0.0967 0.0261 0.1246
1980 0.1587 0.0198 0.0745 0.8938 0.1062 0.0256 0.1331
1985 0.1853 0.0223 0.0517 0.9029 0.0971 0.0252 0.1602
1990 0.2016 0.0178 0.0452 0.9091 0.0909 0.0203 0.1814
1995 0.2005 0.0167 0.0711 0.9066 0.0934 0.0218 0.1788
2000 0.2154 0.0178 0.0783 0.9072 0.0928 0.0234 0.1920
Annual rates of inequality reduction (%)
1850–1913 –0.59 –0.08 –1.53 –0.50 –0.67
1870–1913 0.18 1.42 –1.02 0.75 –0.40
1900–1950 –1.58 –2.48 0.30 –2.09 –1.18
1913–1938 –0.65 –0.45 0.90 –0.22 –0.94
1913–1950 –1.94 –3.21 0.78 –2.38 –1.56
1950–1980 0.32 4.64 3.08 4.09 –1.39
1938–1980 –1.09 0.75 2.35 0.95 –1.81
1980–2000 –1.53 0.53 –0.25 0.45 –1.83
1950–2000 –0.42 3.00 1.75 2.63 –1.57
Sources: See text.
Notes: Boldface indicates interwar borders. Latin America (LA7) is comprised of Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Cuba, Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela. OECD (14) is comprised of Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United
Kingdom, and the United States.
Table 1A.2 Inter-country inequality in per capita GDP, 1900–2000
MLD indices Population shares Inequality
OECD and Latin Latin Within Between 
Latin America OECD America OECD America regions regions
1900 0.1338 0.0517 0.2084 0.8783 0.1217 0.0707 0.0630
1913 0.1377 0.0546 0.2465 0.8666 0.1334 0.0802 0.0575
1913 0.1440 0.0569 0.2465 0.8602 0.1398 0.0834 0.0605
1925 0.1366 0.0512 0.1959 0.8478 0.1522 0.0732 0.0634
1929 0.1457 0.0554 0.2045 0.8417 0.1583 0.0790 0.0667
1933 0.1184 0.0280 0.1679 0.8368 0.1632 0.0508 0.0676
1938 0.1341 0.0388 0.1683 0.8311 0.1689 0.0607 0.0734
1950 0.2377 0.1383 0.1695 0.7975 0.2025 0.1446 0.0931
1955 0.2198 0.0995 0.1427 0.7850 0.2150 0.1088 0.1111
1960 0.1996 0.0632 0.1188 0.7717 0.2283 0.0759 0.1237
1965 0.2105 0.0412 0.1389 0.7561 0.2439 0.0650 0.1455
1970 0.2128 0.0228 0.1288 0.7393 0.2607 0.0504 0.1624
1975 0.1966 0.0176 0.0825 0.7225 0.2775 0.0356 0.1610
1980 0.2054 0.0173 0.0699 0.7026 0.2974 0.0330 0.1725
1985 0.2461 0.0205 0.0528 0.6887 0.3113 0.0306 0.2156
1990 0.2830 0.0187 0.0532 0.6773 0.3227 0.0298 0.2532
1995 0.2838 0.0183 0.0691 0.6722 0.3278 0.0349 0.2488
2000 0.3106 0.0185 0.0800 0.6581 0.3419 0.0395 0.2711
Annual rates of inequality reduction (%)
1900–1950 –1.15 –1.97 0.41 –1.43 –0.78
1913–1938 0.28 1.53 1.53 1.27 –0.77
1913–1950 –1.36 –2.40 1.01 –1.49 –1.16
1950–1980 0.49 6.92 2.96 4.93 –2.06
1938–1980 –1.02 1.92 2.09 1.45 –2.03
1980–2000 –2.07 –0.33 –0.68 –0.91 –2.26
1950–2000 –0.54 4.02 1.50 2.59 –2.14
Theil indices GDP shares Inequality
OECD and Latin Latin Within Between 
Latin America OECD America OECD America regions regions
1900 0.0990 0.0485 0.2206 0.9626 0.0374 0.0549 0.0441
1913 0.1015 0.0497 0.2605 0.9534 0.0466 0.0596 0.0420
1913 0.1060 0.0515 0.2605 0.9511 0.0489 0.0617 0.0442
1925 0.1042 0.0486 0.2080 0.9453 0.0547 0.0573 0.0469
1929 0.1107 0.0519 0.2202 0.9433 0.0567 0.0614 0.0494
1933 0.0865 0.0268 0.1861 0.9409 0.0591 0.0362 0.0503
1938 0.0991 0.0363 0.1813 0.9405 0.0595 0.0449 0.0542
1950 0.2001 0.1280 0.1731 0.9303 0.0697 0.1312 0.0689
1955 0.1783 0.0939 0.1480 0.9313 0.0687 0.0976 0.0807
1960 0.1543 0.0602 0.1247 0.9291 0.0709 0.0647 0.0895
1965 0.1518 0.0406 0.1454 0.9291 0.0709 0.0480 0.1038
1970 0.1465 0.0223 0.1387 0.9262 0.0738 0.0309 0.1156
1975 0.1412 0.0174 0.0936 0.9163 0.0837 0.0238 0.1175
(continued )
Table 1A.2 (continued)
Theil indices GDP shares Inequality
OECD and Latin Latin Within Between 
Latin America OECD America OECD America regions regions
1980 0.1496 0.0170 0.0784 0.9095 0.0905 0.0225 0.1271
1985 0.1765 0.0199 0.0574 0.9174 0.0826 0.0230 0.1535
1990 0.1964 0.0181 0.0544 0.9231 0.0769 0.0208 0.1755
1995 0.1968 0.0177 0.0740 0.9192 0.0808 0.0222 0.1746
2000 0.2129 0.0180 0.0851 0.9186 0.0814 0.0234 0.1895
Annual rates of inequality reduction (%)
1900–1950 –1.41 –1.94 0.48 –1.74 –0.89
1913–1938 0.27 1.40 1.45 1.27 –0.81
1913–1950 –1.72 –2.46 1.10 –2.04 –1.20
1950–1980 0.97 6.74 2.64 5.87 –2.04
1938–1980 –0.98 1.81 2.00 1.64 –2.03
1980–2000 –1.76 –0.29 –0.41 –0.20 –2.00
1950–2000 –0.12 3.93 1.42 3.44 –2.02
Sources: See text.
Notes: Boldface indicates interwar borders. Latin America (LA10) is comprised of Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. OECD (20) is comprised of
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the
United States.
Table 1A.3 Inter-country inequality in per capita GDP, 1925–2000
MLD indices Population shares Inequality
OECD and Latin Latin Within Between 
Latin America OECD America OECD America regions regions
1925 0.1332 0.0513 0.1981 0.8521 0.1479 0.0730 0.0602
1929 0.1431 0.0554 0.2086 0.8459 0.1541 0.0790 0.0641
1933 0.1160 0.0279 0.1727 0.8410 0.1590 0.0509 0.0651
1938 0.1319 0.0389 0.1749 0.8354 0.1646 0.0613 0.0706
1950 0.2352 0.1377 0.1744 0.8022 0.1978 0.1450 0.0902
1955 0.2187 0.0993 0.1496 0.7893 0.2107 0.1099 0.1088
1960 0.1984 0.0632 0.1249 0.7760 0.2240 0.0770 0.1214
1965 0.2092 0.0414 0.1454 0.7606 0.2394 0.0663 0.1429
1970 0.2112 0.0231 0.1357 0.7438 0.2562 0.0519 0.1593
1975 0.1965 0.0179 0.0915 0.7271 0.2729 0.0380 0.1585
1980 0.2062 0.0176 0.0806 0.7072 0.2928 0.0361 0.1701
1985 0.2482 0.0209 0.0658 0.6931 0.3069 0.0347 0.2135
1990 0.2816 0.0189 0.0622 0.6819 0.3181 0.0326 0.2489
1995 0.2855 0.0183 0.0837 0.6764 0.3236 0.0395 0.2461
2000 0.3120 0.0184 0.0930 0.6617 0.3383 0.0436 0.2684
Table 1A.3 (continued)
MLD indices Population shares Inequality
OECD and Latin Latin Within Between 
Latin America OECD America OECD America regions regions
Annual rates of inequality reduction (%)
1925–1938 0.08 2.14 0.96 1.35 –1.23
1925–1950 –2.27 –3.95 0.51 –2.74 –1.62
1950–1980 0.44 6.85 2.57 4.64 –2.12
1938–1980 –1.06 1.88 1.84 1.26 –2.09
1980–2000 –2.07 –0.22 –0.71 –0.95 –2.28
1950–2000 –0.57 4.02 1.26 2.40 –2.18
Theil indices GDP shares Inequality
OECD and Latin Latin Within Between 
Latin America OECD America OECD America regions regions
1925 0.1020 0.0488 0.2079 0.9461 0.0539 0.0573 0.0446
1929 0.1089 0.0520 0.2228 0.9445 0.0555 0.0615 0.0474
1933 0.0846 0.0268 0.1896 0.9421 0.0579 0.0362 0.0484
1938 0.0973 0.0364 0.1857 0.9416 0.0584 0.0451 0.0522
1950 0.1977 0.1277 0.1764 0.9317 0.0683 0.1310 0.0667
1955 0.1768 0.0938 0.1538 0.9328 0.0672 0.0978 0.0790
1960 0.1528 0.0603 0.1298 0.9306 0.0694 0.0651 0.0877
1965 0.1502 0.0408 0.1509 0.9305 0.0695 0.0484 0.1017
1970 0.1446 0.0226 0.1439 0.9275 0.0725 0.0314 0.1132
1975 0.1398 0.0177 0.1002 0.9179 0.0821 0.0244 0.1153
1980 0.1483 0.0172 0.0857 0.9112 0.0888 0.0233 0.1250
1985 0.1754 0.0202 0.0660 0.9191 0.0809 0.0239 0.1515
1990 0.1936 0.0182 0.0591 0.9242 0.0758 0.0213 0.1723
1995 0.1950 0.0177 0.0822 0.9206 0.0794 0.0228 0.1722
2000 0.2110 0.0179 0.0919 0.9196 0.0804 0.0238 0.1871
Annual rates of inequality reduction (%)
1925–1938 0.36 2.25 0.87 1.85 –1.20
1925–1950 –2.65 –3.85 0.66 –3.30 –1.61
1950–1980 0.96 6.67 2.41 5.75 –2.09
1938–1980 –1.00 1.78 1.84 1.57 –2.08
1980–2000 –1.76 –0.19 –0.35 –0.11 –2.02
1950–2000 –0.13 3.93 1.30 3.41 –2.06
Sources: See text
Notes: Latin America (LA13) is comprised of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Uruguay, and Venezuela. OECD (21) is com-
prised of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, and the United States.
Table 1A.4 Inter-country inequality in per capita GDP, 1950–2000
MLD indices Population shares Inequality
OECD and Latin Latin Within Between 
Latin America OECD America OECD America regions regions
1950 0.2541 0.1377 0.1729 0.7768 0.2232 0.1456 0.1086
1955 0.2408 0.0993 0.1522 0.7635 0.2365 0.1118 0.1290
1960 0.2229 0.0632 0.1304 0.7497 0.2503 0.0800 0.1429
1965 0.2376 0.0414 0.1514 0.7333 0.2667 0.0708 0.1668
1970 0.2432 0.0231 0.1450 0.7155 0.2845 0.0577 0.1854
1975 0.2281 0.0179 0.1051 0.6978 0.3022 0.0443 0.1838
1980 0.2402 0.0176 0.0966 0.6768 0.3232 0.0432 0.1970
1985 0.2895 0.0209 0.0878 0.6613 0.3387 0.0435 0.2460
1990 0.3320 0.0189 0.0909 0.6487 0.3513 0.0442 0.2878
1995 0.3367 0.0183 0.1129 0.6423 0.3577 0.0521 0.2846
2000 0.3677 0.0184 0.1246 0.6268 0.3732 0.0581 0.3097
Annual rates of inequality reduction (%)
1950–1980 0.19 6.85 1.94 4.05 –1.99
1980–2000 –2.13 –0.22 –1.27 –1.48 –2.26
1950–2000 –0.74 4.02 0.66 1.84 –2.10
Theil indices GDP shares Inequality
OECD and Latin Latin Within Between 
Latin America OECD America OECD America regions regions
1950 0.2116 0.1277 0.1772 0.9254 0.0746 0.1314 0.0802
1955 0.1920 0.0938 0.1563 0.9266 0.0734 0.0984 0.0936
1960 0.1692 0.0603 0.1349 0.9245 0.0755 0.0659 0.1033
1965 0.1684 0.0408 0.1556 0.9245 0.0755 0.0494 0.1190
1970 0.1648 0.0226 0.1506 0.9215 0.0785 0.0327 0.1322
1975 0.1601 0.0177 0.1091 0.9112 0.0888 0.0258 0.1344
1980 0.1704 0.0172 0.0973 0.9042 0.0958 0.0249 0.1455
1985 0.2012 0.0202 0.0814 0.9126 0.0874 0.0256 0.1756
1990 0.2237 0.0182 0.0799 0.9185 0.0815 0.0233 0.2004
1995 0.2254 0.1077 0.1012 0.9144 0.0856 0.0249 0.2005
2000 0.2437 0.0179 0.1121 0.9136 0.0864 0.0260 0.2177
Annual rates of inequality reduction (%)
1950–1980 0.72 6.67 2.00 5.54 –1.99
1980–2000 –1.79 –0.19 –0.71 –0.22 –2.02
1950–2000 –0.28 3.93 0.92 3.24 –2.00
Sources: See text.
Notes: Latin America (LA20) is comprised of all Latin America. OECD (21) is comprised of Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and
the United States.
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